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The introduction of conservation-friendly farming measures is an important tool for 
biodiversity conservation. Recently, a debate has started whether this money is spent 
effectively, i.e. whether it successfully contributes to conserve biodiversity in agricultural 
landscapes. Several types of criticism have been raised that are adequately responded by 
environmental policies leading to spatially and temporally heterogeneous habitats. However 
existing policies for species conservation are still designed to support one conservation 
measure only by paying an equal amount of compensation to all land-users carrying out the 
corresponding measure.  
Regarding ecological findings we firstly point out in which cases environmental policies have 
to be differentiated in space and time. Secondly, we analyse the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for transfer schemes to exist that are able to introduce a spatio-temporally 
heterogeneous land use and land cover type. Thirdly, we reveal that strategic considerations of 
land-owners limit efficiency and fairness considerations of the policy makers when 
determining the ecologically accurate payment scheme. However – surprisingly – if policy 
makers seek to minimise their budget required for implementing the desired policy goal, this 
at the same time guarantees that the individual profits of the land-owners (when performing 
with the desired policy goal) are as equal as feasible. 
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context with regard to Efficiency, Equality and Ecological 
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1. Introduction 
A major part of European biodiversity depends on certain types of agricultural land use which 
are often not anymore economically viable (e.g. Bignal and McCracken 2000, Mac Donald et 
al. 2000). The introduction of agro-environmental policies for supporting conservation-
friendly farming measures is therefore an important tool for biodiversity conservation. In 
Europe billion Euros are spent on such programmes each year (European Commission 2005). 
Recently, a debate has started whether this money is spent effectively, i.e. whether it 
successfully contributes to conserve biodiversity in agricultural landscapes. Several types of 
criticism have been raised. First, due to insufficient knowledge about the effects of 
conservation measures on species, programmes impose the risk of failing to create a suitable 
habitat for this species (e.g. Kleijn et al. 2001). Second, programmes are often directed at one 
or a few species but do not cover all relevant species in an area (e.g. Benton et al. 2003). 
Third, the successful conservation of a particular species may require spatio-temporally 
differentiated conservation measures due to time dependent habitat quality (e.g. Johst et al. 
2001).  
 
Adequate responses to these criticisms are agro-environmental schemes that lead to spatially 
and temporally heterogeneous habitats (cf. Benton et al. 2003). But still, existing policies for 
species conservation are designed to support one conservation measure only - e.g. mowing a 
habitat not before the 15
th of June – and to pay an equal amount of compensation to all land-
users for carrying out the corresponding measure (e.g. Wätzold and Drechsler 2005). 
Arguments in favour of this kind of policy design are firstly, that it comes up with less 
transaction costs than a differentiated policy design and secondly, that equal compensation 
payment is considered as fair with regard to the equality principle of justice and therefore 
fosters the willingness of land-owners to participate in a conservation programme. However 
Whitby and Saunders (1996) found that paying an equal amount of compensation to all land-
users for certain conservation practices not always lead to lower transaction costs that are 
  3sufficient to offset the higher transfers needed to introduce the policy goal (i.e. uniform 
payments may increase the public expenditure). Moreover in the case of heterogeneous 
opportunity costs it is doubtful whether uniform payment satisfies land-owners’ fairness 
considerations. Considering the equity principle of justice it could also be perceived as fair if 
land-owners with higher opportunity costs receive a higher compensation payment.
1 
Moreover such policy design may help to conserve some species but it does not create a 
heterogeneous landscape with e.g. a mosaic of meadows in different stages of succession 
where all grassland species would find a suitable habitat. Consequently uniform 
environmental policy design in a biodiversity context in general is neither ecologically 
effective nor economically efficient; and it is moreover an open question whether this kind of 
policy design meets the subjective fairness considerations of the land-owners. 
 
In the following section two we lay out in which cases habitat heterogeneity is desirable for 
biodiversity conservation. Section three elaborates on the problems of introducing habitat 
heterogeneity by a numerical example. Section four derives the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for payment schemes to exist that foster spatially and temporally heterogeneous 
landscape types. In section five we analyse the quality of the existing payment schemes with 
regard to efficiency and fairness considerations in order to select among the set of feasible 
payment schemes. Finally, in section six we summarise our findings and draw conclusions for 
further research. 
 
2.    Why is habitat heterogeneity desirable for biodiversity 
conservation in agricultural landscapes? 
 
In the face of insufficient knowledge about which habitat is suitable for an endangered 
species, spatially and temporally heterogeneous habitats are best to satisfy the needs of 
endangered species and are naturally, the best approaches to protect the variety of different 
species. As Benton et al. (2003, p.187) strikingly put it „if the environment is sufficiently 
heterogeneous (?…), different taxa will find their own habitats“. However, nowadays, 
intensification processes in the primary sector as well as uniform design of species 
conservation measures lead to a monotony of landscapes that is ineffective or even 
detrimental for species conservation, at least for three reasons: 
                                                 
1 For different models of justice e.g. see Clayton, 2000; Deutsch, 1985, Montada, 2003. 
  42.1. Uncertainty - a major problem in species conservation 
Knowledge about the effects of a conservation measure on a particular species is often 
insufficient. Although field investigations, experiments and ecological modelling can serve as 
tools to estimate the impact of conservation measures on the species under consideration 
(Frank 2004; Grimm & Storch 2000; Johst, Brandl & Pfeifer 2001; Kramer-Schadt, Revilla & 
Wiegand 2005), these approaches have shortcomings. Research has shown that management 
prescriptions that have proved to be effective under experimental conditions do not have the 
desired effect or have unexpected adverse side effects when implemented on farms (Kleijn et 
al. 2001). As a consequence, a programme may fail to provide habitat suitable for the targeted 
species (Berendse et al. 2004; Kleijn & Sutherland 2003). Moreover conservation measures 
suitable for certain landscapes might not be appropriate for other landscapes due to e.g. 
climatic or soil differences (i.e. differing habitat quality) or interactions with different 
ecological and/or economic processes. As a consequence, the impact of conservation 
measures can vary from landscape to landscape (e.g. Johst et al. 2005). Thus, information 
from the field or by means of experiments is often context-dependent and highly variable. In 
consequence, complex ecological or coupled ecological-economic interactions are hard to 
assess. Establishing a heterogeneous landscape with many different habitat types (habitat 
mosaic) is therefore an adequate measure to meet the shortcomings regarding the knowledge 
of the species requirements. It increases the chance to randomly cover those habitat types 
which support the species of interest. In other words, if we have insufficient knowledge about 
which habitat is suitable for an endangered species in the corresponding landscape, this 
species will survive with the highest probability in an area with sufficient habitat 
heterogeneity. 
 
2.2. Habitat suitability is time dependent 
Another aspect that calls for habitat heterogeneity is that habitat suitability is sometimes not 
permanent but time dependent, i.e. transient. For example think of growing grass after cutting 
a meadow (e.g. Johst, Brandl & Pfeifer 2001) or succession sequences in plant or forest 
communities (e.g. see Johst & Huth 2005 and references therein). Such transient habitats 
show time dependent habitat suitability for many species. Although these species can cope 
with the resulting landscape dynamics by specific traits, like high mobility (e.g. Johst, Brandl 
& Eber 2002; Keymer et al. 2000), they need spatial-temporally heterogeneity in form of a 
shifting mosaic in habitat quality (of suitable habitat). As habitat quality is transient and thus 
  5dependent on the point in time e.g. farming activities (like mowing) take place, a mosaic of 
shifting qualities can only be generated by spatial-temporally differentiated conservation 
measures. 
 
2.3. Conservation of biodiversity involves the consideration of many-species 
Regarding ecological effectiveness, conservation programmes should be directed to more than 
one - if not all - endangered species in a region (Benton, Vickery & Wilson 2003; Tews et al. 
2004; Drechsler et al. 2005). Naturally this requires a heterogeneous landscape matching the 
different species-specific requirements in time and/or space so that each species can find its 
own habitat (e.g. Benton et al. 2003). For example in the Landau region in Germany various 
animal species that need grassland habitat - whinchat ( Saxicola rubetra), and butterfly 
species, such as the Large Copper, Lycaena dispar, and the Large Blue, Maculinea teleius - 
are endangered and protected by the EU Habitats Directive. These species require quite 
different mowing dates to ensure high breeding success of the birds as well as successful egg 
deposition of the two butterfly species. Meeting the needs of these three species requires 
diversified mowing activities that are not covered by the existing uniform payment scheme 
that call farmers to not mow before the 15
th of June (Drechsler et al. 2005). 
Our arguments given above (in points 1 and 2) are of course superimposed in the multi-
species context. For example it is much more difficult to gain knowledge about the 
requirements of multiple species to be conserved than on one species only. Above that species 
interactions arise that are often not well understood. Hence, confessing firstly, that 
uncertainties regarding the desired type of habitat exist and secondly, that habitat quality is 
time dependent, a reasonable suggestion for biodiversity protection is, to establish a spatial-
temporally heterogeneous land use and land cover pattern.  
 
3.    Protecting endangered species by a spatial-temporally 
heterogeneous landscape: A numerical example 
 
To protect a diversity of species with different requirements regarding the type and the quality 
of habitat, agro-environmental policies have to be differentiated in space and time. This calls 
for a non-uniform design of compensation payment as will be shown with the help of a simple 
numerical example: 
  6We focus on two land-owners (i=1, 2) and three time periods respectively conservation 
measures (t=0, a, b). Assume the costs [Ci(t)] when switching from t=0 to t=a to be C1(a)=2 
for land-owner 1 and C2(a)=3 for land-owner 2; switching from t=0 to t=b may lead to 
C1(b)=3 and C2(b)=3,5; i.e.: 
Table 1: Opportunity costs 
Opportunity costs / Land-
owners 
Land-owner 1  Land-owner 2 
Ci(0) 0  0 
Ci(a) 2  3 
Ci(b) 3  3,5 
 
We here assume a case where land-owners’ opportunity costs increase with time. The 
underlying reason for example are that the later the crops are harvested or meadows are 
mowed the lower is usually their energy content and hence the yields of the land-owners. 
Additionally the risk of adverse weather conditions increases with the delay of activity and 
thus decreases the yield expectations of the land-owners. Hence policy design faces the 
problem that with one uniform payment all but not just one desired group of land-owners 
attempts to shift their measures as close to the status quo period (t=0) as is possible within the 




To show that the objective of creating a spatio-temporally diversified landscape is not met by 
a uniform compensation payment [pt], assume pa= pb=4 for delaying activities from t=0 to t=a 
respectively t=b. 
 
With the offer of pt=4 it is attractive for both land-owners to switch from t=0 to t=a; they gain 
4-2=2 and 4-3=1 respectively. In comparison, a switch to t=b yields a lower profit (4-3=1 and 
4-3,5=0,5 respectively). Thus, the offer of one uniform subsidy is unable to diversify the 
                                                 
2 In section 4., below, we drop the assumption of increasing opportunity costs and show that our results hold for 
a variety of cost functions. Moreover notice that the focus here could also be on three different conservation 
measures that should be performed within one or different time periods. 
  7landscape since both land-owners shift their activities simultaneously to the time period 
closest to the status quo (t=0).  
 
Moreover it can be shown that even this shift is not guaranteed in face of insufficient 
information on the individual opportunity costs of the farmer: If policy makers due to lacks in 
knowledge follow a trial and error procedure and start to offer a subsidy pt<2 the land-owners 
prefer the stay in the status quo. Consequently to guarantee right from the start that at least 
one of the land-owners is willing to participate in the conservation program information on 
the individual opportunity costs of the land-owners is required.  
 
Case 2: 
Now the policy maker diversifies the payment scheme and offers a differing subsidy pa and 
pb. We first point out that even a diversified payment scheme (i.e. pa≠pb) does not 
automatically avoid the problem of simultaneous moves. The determination of ecologically 
adequate payment schemes is thus a challenge for environmental research. To show this we 
assume pa=4 as before and pb=6. 
 
As was the case before, both land-owners like to switch simultaneously – now, to t=b. Land-
owner 1 gains 6-3=3 and land-owner 2 gains 6-3,5=2,5 which makes both better off than 
performing activities in t=0 respectively t=a. 
 
Lets assume budget constraints were not given and the policy maker increases the budget for 
t=a to pa=4,5 while pb remains at a value of 6. Still, both land-owners prefer to perform their 
activities in one and the same time period, i.e. here, t=b. For land-owner 1 the gains from 
switching to period a: 4,5-2=2,5 are still less than the profit in t=b that amounts to 6-3-=3. For 
land-owner 2 the considerations are alike, 4,5-3=1,5<6-3,5=2,5. Hence increasing the budget 
not necessarily solves the problem. Payment schemes that allow to separate the activities of 
the land-owners have to lie in the range pb>3,5 and pb-1<pa<pb-0,5 (e.g. pa=4,7 and pb=5,5) as 
will be proofed in section 4, below. 
 
  8Before we turn to the derivation of conditions that assure the existence of payment schemes, 
able to introduce a diversified land use and land cover type, we keep in mind that first, in 
order to avoid adaptations of pt (a process of trial and error) knowledge about the land-
owners’ cost functions is already needed to guarantee the implementation of one specific 
conservation measure (e.g. the delay of a mowing activity to one further period); and second, 
that there is only a certain range of payment schemes that deliver incentives for a group of 
land-owners to diversify their activities in space and time. 
 
4. The existence of ecologically accurate payment schemes 
In the following we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for transfer schemes to 
exist those are able to introduce a spatial-temporally heterogeneous land use and land cover 
type. 
 
4.1. Introduction of the model 
To illustrate the coherences mentioned above, we introduce three land-owners numbered i=1, 
2, 3 and three activities t=0, a, b. Each land-owner represents a group of land-owners with 
roughly the same costs for switching their business as usual activities (t=0) to more 
conservation-friendly ones (a or b). Each representative land-owner controls a certain land 
area. The objective of the conservation manager is that each of the three measures of concern 
(t=0, a, b) is carried out by exactly one representative land-owner (i.e. in one of the three 
spatial areas). 
 
A land-owner i carrying out the measure t achieves a certain profit πi(t). Without loss of 
generality we scale these profits with regard to t=0, which is achieved by setting πi(0)=0 (i=1, 
2, 3). The costs of the measures vary. Without policy intervention each land-owner has an 
incentive to perform activity t=0 (business as usual). In this setting the landscape is not 
diversified because each land-owner performs the same activity (t=0). If a land-owner 
switches to activity a or b this leads to opportunity costs (foregone profits) as given by 
 
) ( ) ( t t C i i π − =           ( 1 )  
 
 
  9We assume each land-owner to carry out the measure that maximises his/her total profit. 
Given positive opportunity costs for all i=1, 2, 3 and t=a, b, inducing a spatial-temporally 
heterogeneous landscape requires compensation payments pt (t=a, b). For a land-owner who 
switches from t=0 to another activity the profit becomes 
 
) b , a ; 3 , 2 , 1 ( ) ( ) ( = = − = t i t C p t i t i π         ( 2 )  
 
 
The payments pa and pb have two functions. First they have to induce land-owners to switch 
from t=0 to another activity. Second, they have to ensure that no activity is performed more 
than once to implement the portfolio of (here, three) measures. The proper determination of 
the payments is crucial for the implementation of a spatial-temporally heterogeneous land use 
and land cover type; it decides on the success of the policy measure, i.e. on whether a pre-
specified subsidy scheme is able to avoid similar moves (uniform choices) of the land-owners 
and to introduce a heterogeneous landscape. 
 
4.2. Existence of payment schemes introducing a spatial-temporally heterogeneous land use 
and cover type 
The design of an ecologically accurate transfer scheme is a challenge for the policy maker. 
The payments have to be determined such that profit is maximised for one land-owner by 
carrying out the measure t=0, for another land-owner by carrying out t=a, and for the third 
land-owner by carrying out t=b. Below such a payment scheme will be called an “ecologically 
accurate payment scheme”. Initially we do not know which of the three land-owner is willing 
to switch from t=0 to t=a, and t=b respectively. There are six possible ways of how the land-
owners could allocate their activities. Without loss of generality we consider the following 
sequence: land-owner 1 chooses t=0, land-owner 2 performs with t=a and land-owner 3 with 
t=b, and investigate whether a payment scheme (pa, pb) exists that achieves this particular 
sequence. To achieve the assumed sequence we need to fulfil the following inequalities:  
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With eq. (2), fulfilling eq. (3) is equivalent to fulfilling 
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To fulfil eq. (4), three necessary conditions have to be fulfilled: 
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We now assume that eq. (5) holds and focus on the sufficient conditions for an ecologically 
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Equations (4a, b) and (6) are the necessary and sufficient constraints on the existence of an 
accurate payment scheme (pa,  pb). If we identify combinations (pa,  pb) as points in two-
dimensional space and plot pa from left to right and pb from bottom to top, then eqs. (4a, b) 
tell that (pa, pb) must lie within a rectangle with left and right bounds given by C2(a) and C1(a) 
and upper and lower bounds given by C1(b) and C3(b), respectively (Fig. 1, below). 
 
Equations (6) and (7) tell that (pa, pb) must lie within a strip with upper and lower bounds p
(u) 
and  p
(l), respectively. Altogether, feasible payment schemes lie in the intersection of the 
rectangle (eqs. 4a, b) and the strip (eqs. 6, 7). Fig. 1 clearly demonstrates the necessity of eq. 
(5): Without fulfilment of equation (5a, b) a rectangle with non-zero area does not exist and 
without fulfilment of eq. (5c) a strip with non-zero area does not exist. 
 












Feasible payment schemes (pa, pb) lie in the shaded area (excluding the boundaries) which is 






If an intersection between strip and rectangle exists, policy makers are thus given the 
opportunity to induce a spatial-temporally differentiated land use and land cover type by a 
pre-specified subsidy scheme. This transfer scheme has to be designed such that on the one 
hand it covers the opportunity costs of delay, i.e. the costs of switching from t=0 - the most 
desired activity from each land-owners’ point of view in case of no governmental intervention 
- to an activity a or b, and on the other hand such, that no activity is chosen by more than one 
land-owner. Figure 1 shows that such a design is feasible if the strip lies neither above nor 
below the rectangle (i.e. an intersection exists). This is if the left upper corner of the rectangle 
is above the lower bound (eq. 7b) of the strip, i.e., if 
 
) a ( ) a ( ) b ( )) a ( ( ) b ( 2 3 3 2 a
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The strip does not lie below the rectangle if the lower right corner of the rectangle is below 
the upper bound (eq. 7a) of the strip, i.e., if 
 
                                                 
3 The dashed line marks an iso-budget line (cf. section 5.). 
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To summarise, ecologically accurate payment schemes exist if and only if a rectangle and a 
strip with non-zero area exist and overlap, i.e. if and only if eqs. (4) and (8) are fulfilled. 
Rearranging and combining equations (4) and (8) we obtain the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of ecologically accurate payment schemes:
4  
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            ( 9 )  
 
Generalising from the fixed indices (1, 2, 3) to variable ones, eq. (9) becomes: 
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            ( 1 0 )  
with u, v, w ∈ {1,2,3} and u v, u w, v ≠ ≠ ≠ w. 
 
Equation (10) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a payment scheme that induces 
land-owner u to carry out the measure a, land-owner v to carry out b and land-owner w to 
carry out t=0. The selection rule of eq. (10) is: Form all possible combinations of land-
owners, calculate each sum of cost and select the combination with the minimal costs. 
 
Two outcomes are possible:
5
 
1.  There is a unique sequence S of land-owners for which the sum of costs is minimal. 
This sequence S fulfils eq. (10) so that ecologically accurate payment schemes exist 
that separate the land-owners such that a spatial-temporally heterogeneous landscape 
is introduced by a voluntary switch from t=0 to t≠0. These payment schemes introduce 
a sequence of land-owners S so that no activity is chosen more than once. No other 
sequence doing this job can be obtained by any payment scheme. 
                                                 
4   One could also include the cost of the land-owner with activity t=0 which is zero by normalisation (eq. 2). 
5   Although studying the three land-owner case is sufficient to catch the problem it is shown in appendix 1 that 
our results also hold in the N land-owner case. 
  132.  Several sequences exist that lead to the same minimal sum of costs. Equation (10) 
cannot be fulfilled and no payment scheme exists that is able to induce any unique 
sequence. In this case no spatial-temporally heterogeneous land use and land cover 
type can be obtained by a clearly defined payment scheme. The underlying reason is 
that in order to make one land-owner shift from t=0 to t=a (b respectively), this land-
owner is to compensate such that incentives for a further land-owner arise to choose 
the same activity as well. With it the problem of similar choices can not be solved. 
 
4.3. Cost functions fostering the existence of feasible payment schemes 
We now discuss for which types of cost functions Ci(t) with i∈{u, v, w} an accurate payment 
scheme exists and specify as follows: 
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In words, αi gives the cost for t=a and βi the relative cost change from t=a to t=b. Inserting eq. 
(11) into equation (10) leads to 5 conditions whose joint fulfilment for some sequence (u, v, 
w) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a feasible payment scheme: 
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   (12) 
 
Below we develop a class of cost functions that fulfils eq. (12). First we assume that the costs 
of all land-owners for t=a differ from each other. Then without loss of generality we can 
arrange these costs in decreasing order and write 
 
w v u α α α > >             ( 1 3 )  
 
With some rearrangement, one can show that eq. (12) is implied by eq. (13) and 
 
] , min[ v v u u w w α β α β α β <           ( 1 4 )  
 
  14Noting that αiβi denotes the cost increase of land-owner i regarding activities a and b, eqs. 
(13) and (14) tell that this increase must be minimal for the land-owner who has the smallest 
cost for t=a. In our notation this is land-owner w. As a result, this land-owner will carry out 
the measure t=b (!) while land-owners u and v will choose t=0 and t=a, respectively. Given 
eq. (13), a special type of cost functions that fulfils eq. (14) are “isomorphic” cost functions 
which have the same shape, such that the βi are equal for all i.
6
 
It should be emphasized that the joint fulfilment of eqs. (13) and (14) is not necessary for the 
fulfilment of eq. (10) and the existence of ecologically accurate payment schemes, but it is 
sufficient. This means that if one can find a sequence (u, v, w) that fulfils eqs. (13) and (14) 
feasible payment schemes exist, but there exist types of cost functions that do not fulfil eqs. 
(13) and (14) and still may lead to accurate payment schemes. These cost functions however 
may be less easily defined and understood. Moreover eqs. (13) and (14) cover a large class of 
cost functions, so it is likely that a set of cost function either fulfils eqs. (13) and (14) or it 
does not fulfil eq. (12). 
 
5. The quality of ecologically accurate payment schemes 
In the previous section we have discussed the conditions for the existence of ecologically 
accurate payment schemes (pa,  pb). In this section we presuppose that feasible payment 
schemes exist and from a policy maker’s point of view identify the optimal one. Of course 
there may be different objectives a payment scheme may or should fulfil. One objective could 
be that the design of the payment scheme should minimise the sum of the costs of the land-
owners (criterion of cost-efficiency). A further objective could be to minimise the sum of the 
subsidies given to the land-owners (criterion of budget-efficiency). Additionally fairness 
considerations could be in the objective function of the political decision maker. And of 
course regulators might wish to follow different goals simultaneously. In order to select 
among the feasible payment schemes we elaborate on these different criteria. 
 
5.1 The criterion of cost-efficiency 
In section 4 we have shown that there is only one unique sequence (u, v, w) that fulfils 
equation (10). The sum of costs is Cv(a)+Cw(b). This sum is independent of the choice of the 
subsidies  pa and pb. Consequently individual profit maximisation ensures that each land-
                                                 
6   See Appendix 2 for the case of N>3 land-owners. 
  15owner gains most if s/he seeks to minimise her/his cost given the subsidy for delay. Hence it 
is obvious that Pareto-improvement is highest if the policy maker seeks to minimise the 
subsidies, i.e. if he follows the criterion of budget-efficiency. 
 
5.2 The criterion of budget-efficiency 
Budget-efficiency implies that the sum of the subsidies, B= pa+pb, is minimised. Without loss 
of generality we again assume that the (unique) sequence that can be induced by the payment 
schemes is (1, 2, 3), i.e. land-owner 1 carries out the measure t=0 (business as usual; no 
subsidy is paid), land-owner 2 chooses t=a (stimulated by the payment pa) and land-owner 3 
performs with t=b (due to the offer of pb). Figure 1 illustrates that iso-budget lines are lines 
with slope minus one (dashed line). The line representing the smallest budget is:  
 
] [ min b a min p p B + =   s . t .   e q .   ( 4 )          ( 1 5 )  
 
which is the one closest possible to the “origin” of the rectangle, i.e. to the rectangle’s lower 
left corner (C2(a), C3(b)).  
 
There are three different cases with feasible payment schemes to distinguish: 
a)  The lower bound of the strip lies above the origin of the rectangle (the case shown in 
Fig. 1), 
b)  The upper bound of the strip lies below the origin of the rectangle, 
c)  The origin of the rectangle lies within the strip. 
 
Case (a): The lower bound of the strip lies above the origin of the rectangle, i.e.  
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Here the minimum feasible budget is achieved at the point where the lower bound of the strip 
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  16To consider that the boundaries of the shapes in Fig. 1 do not belong to the set of feasible 
payment schemes we introduced arbitrarily small but positive δa and δb. To simplify the 
notation, we write 
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The budget has the magnitude (with = rpointing out that the budget is arbitrarily higher due to 
δa, δb >0) 
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Case (b): The upper bound of the strip lies below the origin of the rectangle, i.e.  
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Here the minimum feasible budget is achieved at the point where the upper bound of the strip 
(eq. 7b) intersects the lower border of the rectangle: 
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The budget has magnitude 
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Case (c): the origin of the rectangle lies within the strip, i.e.,  
 
  17) b ( ) b ( ) a ( ) a ( 2 3 3 2 C C C C < ∧ <          ( 2 2 )  
 
Here the minimum feasible budget is given by origin of the rectangle; 
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and has magnitude 
 
) b ( ) a ( 3 2 min C C B + = r            ( 2 4 )  
 
The general interpretation of the three cases is as follows: 
 
Case (a): The cost of the land-owner 2 who performs with activity t=a [C2(a)] is higher than 
the cost land-owner 3 would have if s/he carried out the measure t=a [C3(a)] by an amount 
εb=C2(a)-C3(a)>0. The total profit of land-owner 2 (eq. 2) is pa
*-C2(a)= r0 while that of land-
owner 3 is pb
*-C3(b)= rεb. The quantity εb is an incentive component that has to be paid to 
land-owner 3 for not performing with activity t=a [that is subsidised by pa
*= r
C2(a)>C3(a)]. 
Positive εb implies pb*-C3(b)= r pa*-C3(a), which means that for land-owner 3 the choice of t=b 
is more attractive than the choice of t=a because of pb*=C3(b) + εb ≥ pa*-C3(a). At the same 
time it implies [with eq. (5c)] pa*-C2(a) > pb*-C2(b). The budget has to cover the costs 
C2(a)+C3(b) plus the incentive component εb. 
 
Case (b): The cost of the land-owner 3 carrying out t=b [C3(b)] is higher than the cost land-
owner 2 would have if s/he carried out the measure t=b [C2(b)] by an amount εa =C3(b)-
C2(b)>0. The total profit of land-owner 3 is (just above) zero while that of land-owner 2 is just 
above εa. The quantity εa is an incentive component that has to be paid to land-owner 2 for not 
performing with activity t=b [that is subsidised by pb*= r
C3(b)>C2(b)]. Thus, with arguments 
analogous to case (a), offering the incentive component εa ensures that for land-owner 2 the 
choice of t=a is more attractive than t=b while for land-owner 3 the choice of t=b is more 
attractive than t=a. 
 
  18Case (c): Neither case (a) nor case (b) is observed (note that due to eq. (5c) case (a) excludes 
case (b) and vice versa, so all three cases are mutually exclusive). The total profits of both 
land-owners are just above zero, i.e. pa= rC2(a) and pb= rC3(b). In this case there are no 
incentives for similar choices - i.e., no additional incentives have to be set by the design of the 
payment scheme (the incentive components εa and εb equal zero) so that the budget has to 
cover the opportunity costs C2(a)+C3(b) only.  
 
5.3 The fairness criterion  
Fairness can be specified according to different criteria. If opportunity costs are 
heterogeneous it could be perceived as fair if each land-owner is compensated according to 
his efforts for inducing the desired management goal. The efforts of each land-owner are 
reflected in the land-owner specific costs of delay, i.e. C2(a) and C3(b). Above, we have 
shown that the subsidy equals the land-owners’ specific costs of delay if and only if case c 
(see section 4, above) is observed. If cases a or b are found, there is one land-owner who is 
able to improve his/her profits by switching to an already chosen activity. This strategic 
incentive has to be compensated by the payment scheme. Hence there is no scope for meeting 
the equity criterion if land-owners impose their strategic power, i.e., if they follow individual 
profit maximisation only. 
 
In the following we therefore seek for a distribution of subsidies ensuring that the total profits 
of the land-owners with choices a and b are as equal as possible, i.e. the payment scheme that 
minimises: |pa-Cv(a)-[pb-Cw(b)]|. 
 
Considering the fairness objective  
 
| ) a ( ) b ( | b a v w C C p p F − + − =         ( 2 5 )  
 
we find that “Even-fairness-lines” (where the objective function F has the same value) are 
those lines where the difference pa-pb is constant. These are lines with slope +1 in the (pa, pb)–
space. Fairness is thus maximised (F is minimal) by the line closest to the one that runs 
through the origin of the rectangle. Setting u=1, v=2 and w=3 without loss of generality this 
line is given by 
 
) a ( ) b ( 2 3 a b C C p p − + =            ( 2 6 )  
  19Now consider the three cases (a), (b), and (c) of section 4. 
 
In case (a) (Fig. 1), highest fairness is achieved if the payment scheme is located just above 
the lower bound. As that lower bound is given by  
 
) a ( ) b ( 3 3 a
) l ( C C p p − + =         ( 2 7 )  
 
the set of feasible points maximising fairness includes the point (pa,  pb)=[C2(a)+δa, 
C2(a)+C3(b)-C3(a)+δa+δb] which was also found to minimise the budget (eq. 17). 
 
In case (b) highest fairness is achieved if the payment scheme is located just below the upper 
bound of the strip. As that upper bound is given by  
 
) a ( ) b ( 2 2 a
) u ( C C p p − + =         ( 2 8 )  
 
the set of feasible points maximising fairness includes the point (pa,  pb)=[C2(a) +C3(b)-
C2(b)+δa, C3(b)] which was found to minimise the budget (eq. 20), too. 
 
In case (c) highest fairness is achieved if the payment scheme is located on the line through 
the rectangle’s origin (eq. 26). This line includes the point (pa, pb)=[C2(a)+δa, C3(b) +δb] 
which again was found to minimise the budget (eq. 23) as well.  
We are thus able to conclude that budget-efficiency in all three cases is equivalent to 
maximising fairness, in a sense that the subsidy scheme introduces the desired ecological goal 
– a spatial-temporally heterogeneous land use and land cover type – by compensation 
payments that are as equal as feasible.
7  
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Our analysis points out that first, spatio-temporally heterogeneous landscapes for species 
protection are required in the face of uncertainty, transient resources and in cases where 
biodiversity (i.e., multi-species) protection is under consideration. Second, the paper reveals 
                                                 
7   Of course if we allow for a higher compensation budget than needed for the introduction of the ecological 
goal we might also derive at more even compensation payments. However one should keep in mind that 
within a group of heterogeneous land-owners different subjective fairness appraisals might be made that are 
not necessarily in line with the equality principle. Hence policy makers should carefully consider whether a 
departure from the criterion of budget efficiency is justified by the argument of fairness. 
  20that spatio-temporally heterogeneous land use and land cover types may not be introduced by 
uniform subsidy design but rather by differentiated compensation payments for a selection of 
different measures. Such transfer schemes not necessarily exist. Though there might be 
incentives for the land-owners to switch form the business as usual to a more conservation-
friendly activity, all land-owners (dependent on their opportunity costs) might like to perform 
with one and the same activity. With that the policy goal – the implementation of a set of 
differing conservation measures – is not met.  
On the other hand there might be more than one feasible payment scheme so that policy 
makers have to select an optimal one. A common starting point of research on this selection 
process is that each land-owner should be compensated according to the individual 
conservation costs. The argument for tailoring payments to each land-owner’s opportunity 
costs is that with higher payments land-owners earn a producer surplus which has to be 
financed by a higher budget than actually needed for achieving the desired level of 
conservation. A higher budget, in turn, leads to a welfare loss as the taxation required to 
finance public funds has a distortion effect on consumption or production (Innes 2000). 
However we have shown that compensation of the opportunity costs is not necessarily 
sufficient for the introduction of a diversified land use and land cover type. To separate the 
land-owners it might be necessary to also compensate their incentives for similar choices. The 
freedom of the land-owners to choose the most desired conservation measure poses strategic 
power to the land-owners that limits efficiency and fairness considerations. However – 
surprisingly – if policy makers seek to minimise their budget required for implementing the 
desired policy goal, this at the same time guarantees that the individual profits of the land-
owners are as equal as possible
8.  
Above that there are cases were neither uniform nor differentiated payment schemes exist to 
foster a heterogeneous landscape type. In these cases policy makers either fail to comply with 
the ecological goal or have to rethink the chosen subsidy approach with pre-specified 




                                                 
8 This agreement between budget-efficiency and fairness consideration will change, however, if a different 
fairness criterion is considered. This may be e.g., to make the payments as equal as possible: min |pb-pa|. 
Analysis of this fairness criterion and the trade-offs with budget-efficiency will be subject to future analysis. 
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  23Appendix A:  
The N land-owner case 
Now turn to the problem of allocating N>3 land-owners to three different activites. Similar to 
the case of N=3, we start considering a particular sequence of land-owners: Let land-owners i 
with i∈Ia={1,…,na} choose activity a, land-owners i∈Ib={na+1…na+nb} activity b and the 
remaining land-owners i∈I0={na+nb+1…N) activity 0. 
 
Similar to above, for a payment scheme to exist that induces just this sequence, the total profit 
of land-owners i=1…na must be maximal for choosing activity a, the total profit of land-
owners  i=na+1…na+nb must be maximal for b and that of the remaining land-owners 
i=na+nb+1…N must be maximal for activity 0. From this we can derive bounds on the feasible 
payments pa and pb in a straight forward manner: 
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Equation (A2) in words:  ) (t Cx  is the maximum of all costs Ci(t) in period t where the 
maximum is taken over all land-owners i∈Ix that are allocated to activity x. The same applies 
for  ) (t Cx , except that the minimum is taken.  ) a , b ( x C  and  ) a , b ( x C  are the 
maximum/minimum of the cost differences between choices a and b, taken over all land-
owners allocated to activity x. Equation (A1.a), e.g., then means that considering the costs of 
activity a, the maximum cost of the land-owners allocated to this activity must be smaller than 
the minimum cost of the land-owners allocated to activity 0. This is plausible, because 
  24otherwise some land-owners would prefer to switch from 0 to a (cf. eq. 4a). Similar to the 
N=3 case, eqs. (A1.a,b) describe a rectangle and eq. (A1.c) a strip with upper and lower 
bounds 
 
) a , b ( ) b (






C p p a
+ =
+ =
         ( A 3 )  
 
 







) b ( b C
) a ( 0 C
) b ( 0 C
), a ( a C
 
 
Following the same procedure as in section 4.2 we can now derive a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of feasible payment schemes: 
 
) a ( ) a , b ( ) b ( ) e (
) b ( ) a ( ) a , b ( ) d (
) a , b ( ) a , b ( ) c (
) b ( ) b ( ) b (


















         ( A 4 )  
 
  25Appendix B:  
Critical Cost functions in the N>3 land-owner case 
 
Similar to the N=3 case one may derive a class of cost functions that fulfils eq. (A4) in 
Appendix A. Inserting eq. (11) into eq. (A4) we obtain 
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where the interpretation of eq. (B2) is analogue to that of eq. (A2). Similar to the N=3 case we 
assume that we can arrange the costs of all land-owners going for a (αi) in decreasing order, 
so we can write  
 
b b a a 0 0 α α α α α α > > > > >          ( B 3 )  
 
which is the analogon to eq. (13). Using  x x x x x x β α α β α α + ≤ +  and  x x x x x x β α α β α α + ≤ +  
(x=0,a,b) and with some straight forward transformations one can find that eq. (B1) is implied 
by eq. (B3) and 
 
] , min[ a a 0 0 b b β α β α β α <           ( B 4 )  
 
  26Analogously to eq. (14), eq. (B4) tells that the maximum cost increase between a shift from a 
to b taken over all land-owners going for b must be smaller than the cost increases for all 
other land-owners. Similar to the N=3 case, eq. (B4) is fulfilled by eq. (B3) and the 
assumption of isomorphic cost functions where βi are equal among all land-owners. Also note 
that eqs. (B3) and (B4) are sufficient but not necessary for the fulfilment of eq. (B1). 
  27